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Beijing, China’s capital city, and one of its fastest-growing municipalities, is running out of water. 
Although more than 200 rivers and streams can still be found on official maps of Beijing, the sad 
reality is that little or no water flows there anymore. Beijing’s springs, famous for their sweet-
tasting water, have disappeared. Dozens of reservoirs built since the 1950s have dried up. Finding 
a clean source of water anywhere in the city has become impossible.  
As recently as 30 years ago, Beijing residents regarded groundwater as an inexhaustible resource. 
Now hydrogeologists warn it too is running out. Beijing’s groundwater table is dropping, water 
is being pumped out faster than it can be replenished, and more and more groundwater is 
becoming polluted. 
Today, more than two-thirds of the municipality’s total water supply comes from groundwater. The 
rest is surface water coming from Beijing’s dwindling reservoirs and rivers. The municipality’s two 
largest reservoirs, Miyun and Guanting, now hold less than ten percent of their original storage 
capacity and Guanting is so polluted it hasn’t been used as a drinking water source since 1997.  
This report traces Beijing’s 60-year transformation from relative water abundance to water crisis, 
and the main policy responses to keep water flowing to China’s capital.   
Executive Summary
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Official data indicates that Beijing’s population growth, industrial development, and its expansion 
of irrigated farmland have driven huge increases in water consumption since 1949. Meanwhile, 
25 years of drought and pollution of the city’s reservoirs have contributed to the steady decline 
in available water resources per person, from about 1,000 cubic metres in 1949 to less than 230 
cubic metres in 2007. 
The report also argues that drought and rapid demand growth aren’t the only factors behind 
the water crisis. Short-sighted policies since 1949 have degraded Beijing’s watershed and 
promoted the over-use of limited water resources. In particular, the political fixation on large-
scale engineering projects to keep urban taps flowing at little or no cost to consumers meant that 
consumption was divorced from consequence without price signals to indicate scarcity. 
Beijing’s policy of guaranteeing water supply to the capital at little or no charge to consumers 
– even as its rivers and reservoirs were drying up – has wreaked havoc on Beijing farmers and 
encouraged wasteful consumption by industrial and urban consumers. In the last five years, with 
Beijing’s surface and groundwater supplies nearing exhaustion, the State Council and Beijing 
authorities have announced several policies to guarantee an adequate water supply for Beijing 
during the 2008 Olympics and beyond. The policies include: 
”emergency water transfers” from existing and proposed reservoirs in Hebei province •	
(2008) and the Yangtze River in Hubei province (starting 2010);
restrictions on surface and groundwater use in upstream Hebei province in an effort to •	
increase river flow to Beijing;
extraction of karst groundwater from depths of 1,000 metres or more from Beijing’s •	
outlying districts.
Such policies for taking ever more water and from ever further jurisdictions beyond Beijing may 
be an emergency measure to ease Beijing’s water shortages and flush out its polluted waterways, 
but it is not a fundamental solution. Long distance diversion is extraordinarily expensive and 
environmentally damaging. Even if water is successfully diverted from Hebei province in 2008 
and the Yangtze River in 2010, groundwater will continue to be Beijing’s most important water 
source. The municipality will still need to continue pumping about three billion cubic metres of 
groundwater annually to keep up with the forecasted growth in demand – that’s 500 million 
cubic metres more than the annual allowable limit for “safe” extraction of groundwater. With 
each new project to tap water somewhere else, demand for water only increases, and at an ever 
greater cost to China’s environment and economy. Whether diverting surface water or digging 
ever-deeper for groundwater, the underlying solution proposed is like trying to quench thirst by 
drinking poison.
The key to addressing Beijing’s water crisis is not more engineering projects to deliver new 
supplies. More dams, diversion canals, pipelines and even desalination plants may be technically 
feasible but they are economically and environmentally ruinous. A better approach would be to 
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curb demand through efficiency improvements in water supply and consumption using the rule of 
law and economic incentives. 
This approach includes: 
enforcing existing laws and regulations to restrict unaccountable, polluting, and water-•	
profligate development and water use;
full-cost water pricing to reduce demand and promote efficient resource use; •	
a new UK-style economic regulator to oversee Beijing’s rising state water and sewerage •	
companies, reward conservation, prevent monopoly abuse and seek maximum value 
for water consumers;  
tradable water rights to better manage competing water demands within Beijing •	
municipality and thereby reduce pressure on surface and groundwater supplies within 
and beyond its borders.   
Shifting from endless supply expansion to a water system based on the rule of law and economic 
incentives to promote sustainable water use is a major challenge for Beijing, just as it is for many 
jurisdictions around the world after decades of water exploitation without the benefit of economic 
discipline or effective environmental regulation. But it is hard to imagine a city region where the 
need and potential for success is greater than that of Beijing.
Quick Facts: Beijing Water 
Per capita water availability: declined from 1,000 cubic metres in 
1949 to less than 230 cubic metres in 2007
Total water use: 3.25 billion cubic metres (2007)
Source: groundwater 70-80%; surface water 20-30%
Estimated supply deficit: 400 million cubic metres 
Water consumption: domestic (39%), agriculture (38%), industry 
(20%), urban environment (3%)  
Between 1995 and 2005: 
     Domestic water use more than doubled 
     Agricultural water use dropped by one-third  
     Industrial water use dropped by one quarter
Beijing Water Report 2008 1
Beijing is a 3,000-year-old city on the northwest edge of the North China Plain, flanked by 
mountains to the northwest, the Huabei plain in the Yongding and Chaobai river valleys in the 
southeast, and the Bohai Sea 150 kilometres to the southeast (see Beijing Municipality Watershed 
Map).  About two-thirds of the municipality is mountainous, the remainder is low-lying plains. 
Beijing city usually refers to the ancient capital, the four city districts, and its near suburbs. The 
entire municipality is much larger, covering an area of 16,808 square kilometres, roughly half the 
size of Belgium. Under its jurisdiction are 16 districts and two rural counties as follows: 
 
4 core city districts of 92 square kilometres•	
4 near suburbs of 1,289 square kilometres•	
8 outer suburbs of 12,405 square kilometres •	
2 rural counties of 4,316 square kilometres •	
Chapter 1:
Beijing Watershed
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1: Beijing Watershed
Since 1949, the population of Beijing has grown from roughly four million to 17 million, making 
it China’s second largest city after Shanghai. The current estimate of population includes several 
million people classified by the central government as “floating population” – the official term 
for temporary residents or migrant workers registered as residents elsewhere. In 2007, Beijing’s 
population expanded by 520,000. Of these people, 157,000 have household registration in Beijing 
municipality and 363,000 are classified as “floating population.” 
 
Figure 1-1 provides a breakdown of Beijing’s population by district and county.
Figure 1-1: Beijing’s districts and counties
Name of District Population
Dongcheng 600,000 Urban
Xicheng 750,000
Chongwen 410,000
Xuanwu 550,000
Chaoyang 2.3 million Suburban
Haidian 2.24 million
Fengtai 1.4 million
Shijingshan 489,000
Mentougou 270,000 Outlying
suburbanShunyi 637,000
Tongzhou 870,000
Fangshan 814,000
Changping 615,000
Pinggu 396,000
Huairou 296,000
Daxing 671,000
Miyun 420,000 Counties
Yanqing 275,000
                                     Total: 14,003,000
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Beijing’s rivers  
About 90 percent of the surface water flowing through Beijing comes from rivers and streams 
outside the municipality in neighbouring regions – Hebei province, Shanxi province, and Inner 
Mongolia. All are part of the much larger Hai river basin which drains into the Bohai Sea. Within 
Beijing municipality, there are five main rivers and more than 200 smaller rivers, most of them 
dried out completely. The five main rivers are: Chaobai and Beiyun in the east, Yongding and 
Juma in the west, and Jiyun in the northeast. 
Chaobai River 
Chaobai River originates in Hecao village where the Chao and Bai rivers meet north of the Yang 
Mountains in Hebei province. The second largest river within the municipality, Chaobai flows 
118 kilometres through four districts, Miyun, Huairou, Shunyi and Tongzhou, before joining the 
Chaobaixin River in neighbouring Tianjin municipality and then emptying into the Bohai Sea. 
The Chaobai was dammed in the 1960s by the Miyun dam and reservoir, which delivers water to 
Beijing city through a 95-kilometre-long canal. (See section on the Miyun reservoir.)
Beiyun or North Grand Canal
Beiyun is the 120-kilometre north section of the Grand Canal, which was built 1,300 years ago 
and links Beijing to Hangzhou in the south. Beiyun served as a major transportation waterway 
for the nation’s capital until the early 20th century. Since the construction of railways, however, 
Beiyun no longer functions as a transportation route and has become a major drainage channel 
instead, earning it the nickname “Beijing paiwu he” or Beijing’s sewer. Year-round, Beiyun 
receives a high volume of industrial wastewater and domestic sewage. Beiyun flows 38 
kilometres through Beijing then into Hebei province before joining the Hai River at Dahongqiao 
(Great Red Bridge) in Tianjin municipality.  
The upper section of Beiyun, upstream of the Beiguan sluice gate in Tongzhou district, is a natural 
river, known as Wenyu. Wenyu originates in the Yanshan Mountains in Changping and Haidian 
districts of Beijing. Wenyu has 39 tributaries, including Nanshahe, Beishahe, Dongsha, Qinghe 
and Liangshuihe.  
Yongding River
Honoured as the “Mother Waters of Beijing,” this river was historically an important water 
source and waterway for Beijing residents. It is Beijing’s largest river, originating from the Yang 
River in Inner Mongolia and the Sanggan River in Shanxi province. It has a total length of 680 
kilometres, flowing 174 kilometres eastward through Beijing before joining the Hai River in 
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Tianjin municipality and emptying into the Bohai Sea. Tributaries include: Naqiu, Qingshuihe, 
Xiamalinggou, Weidiangou, Qingjian, Yingtaogou, Dalonghe, Xiaolonghe, and Tiantanghe. Prior 
to construction of the Guanting dam in the 1950s, the swift-flowing river would swell from 500 
metres to 2,000 metres wide in the rainy season. 
Juma River
Juma River originates in Hebei province and flows through Fanghsan district of Beijing before 
flowing back into Hebei province and splitting into Nanjuma (South Juma) and Beijuma (North 
Juma). One of Juma’s tributaries is the Dashi River, once known as Shenshui (holy water) because 
its water was so pure and such an important source for people in the ancient capital. Tributaries 
include: Dashi and Xiaoqing Rivers. 
Ju River 
Ju River flows through Pinggu district in northeast Beijing. It originates from the Jiyun River in 
Sanhe county, Hebei province. 
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Beijing’s water resources include surface water and groundwater. Surface water refers to water in 
rivers, lakes, and reservoirs. The amount of surface water available fluctuates within and between 
years depending on rainfall. 
Beijing’s rainfall varies geographically, seasonally and annually. Eighty-five percent of the annual 
precipitation falls between July and September. Rainfall also varies between the sub-watersheds 
within the municipality and particularly between mountainous areas and the low-lying plain. 
Beijing’s average yearly precipitation is 590 millimetres (mm) with a recorded high of 1,406 mm 
in 1959 and a low of 242 mm in 1869.  In comparison, Shanghai, a city with roughly the same 
population as Beijing, receives an average annual rainfall of 1,411 mm. New York City, which is at 
the same latitude as Beijing, receives an average rainfall of 1,090 mm. 
Chapter 2:
Beijing’s Water Resources
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Drought
Beijing has recorded 25 years of drought since the 1970s. Drought, in this context, is broadly 
defined as below-average rainfall. Meteorologists in Beijing define an extremely dry year as 300 
mm of rainfall or less, which is about 50 percent below average. A moderately dry year is defined 
as 450 mm of rainfall or about 25 percent below average. 
Between 1999 and 2008, Beijing’s average annual precipitation was 428 mm or 28 percent below 
average. Figure 2-1 summarizes the decline in average annual precipitation.  
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Declining surface runoff  
 
The total amount of surface runoff in Beijing’s five river systems is estimated to be 4.7 billion 
cubic metres in a normal year, which drops by 45 percent to 2.6 billion cubic metres in a dry year. 
To regulate and store surface runoff, Beijing built a total of 85 dams and reservoirs between 1950 
and 1995. The amount of surface water available for use (either from rivers or reservoirs) in an 
average year is 1.67 billion cubic metres and only 1 billion cubic metres in a dry year. 
In the last few decades, the volume of surface runoff entering Beijing’s two largest reservoirs, 
Guanting and Miyun, has dropped sharply. According to Figure 2-2, the average inflow to 
Guanting reservoir dropped 90 percent between the 1950s and 2000.  
By 2005, the total volume of water entering both reservoirs had dropped to just 459 million cubic 
metres, down 27 percent from 632 million cubic metres in 2004.
Groundwater
Groundwater refers to the water flowing underground between rocks and soil. It can be divided 
into two types: shallow and deep. In general, the deeper the groundwater, the longer it takes to be 
replenished by rainfall and seepage. Wherever groundwater is extracted in huge quantities, land 
subsidence – the loss of surface elevation due to the removal of subsurface support – can occur. 
The rate of groundwater recharge (or replenishment) is highly variable and uncertain; it varies over 
time and space and according to precipitation, aquifer structures (i.e. karst, sand, granite), rock 
properties, ground cover and the rate of extraction. 
The shallow groundwater on the Beijing plain is recharged 44 percent by precipitation and 31 
percent by seepage of surface water. As the area covered by buildings and roads has increased 
dramatically in recent years, less water is able to seep through the ground naturally. Both the rate 
and volume of groundwater recharge are decreasing.  
The term “available groundwater” usually refers to water found at shallow depths (i.e. 1 to 100 
metres) that is easily extracted, quickly replenished by rainfall and seepage, and doesn’t cause 
subsidence problems when extracted. The Beijing Water Bureau estimates that its available 
groundwater – that which can be safely extracted without depleting the resource – ranges from 
2.0 to 2.45 billion cubic metres per year, depending on rainfall.  
Total available water supply
Available water supply refers to the amount of water available for treatment and distribution 
through the city’s water pipeline system. These figures do not include water that is reused after 
treatment. Taking surface water and groundwater, the Beijing Water Bureau estimates the volume 
2: Beijing’s Water Resources
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of exploitable water resources ranges from 3.0 to 4.12 billion cubic metres per year, depending on 
rainfall. 
Table 2-1: Total available water supply (billion cubic metres/year)
Available Water Resources Range Current
Surface Water 1.0 – 1.67 0.80
Groundwater 2.0 – 2.45 2.45
Total 3.0 – 4.12 3.25
Under present conditions, the Beijing Water Bureau estimates its total available water supply is 
approximately 3.25 billion cubic metres annually with 0.8 billion cubic metres supplied by the 
Miyun and Guanting reservoirs and 2.45 billion cubic metres from groundwater sources. 
Guanting reservoir 
Completed on the Yongding River in the 1950s, Guanting reservoir is situated at the 
border between Yanqing county (Beijing) and Huailai county, Hebei province.
With a maximum storage capacity of 4.16 billion cubic metres, the Guanting reservoir 
was originally designed as a multipurpose project that included power generation, 
fisheries development, and water supply for industry, agriculture, and domestic 
purposes. 
In the 1980s, Guanting was supplying drinking water for tens of thousands of urban 
households. By 1997, however, the reservoir had become too polluted to use as a 
source of drinking water.  
A brief history of Guanting management follows: 
1971 
  
Local residents fell ill after eating fish caught from the reservoir’s polluted water. Tens of 
thousands of fish in the reservoir had died, but at that time few people had any concept 
of pollution or the environment. Because the incident occurred during the “Great 
Cultural Revolution” (1966-1976) it was immediately linked to politics. The rumour 
went that “class enemies” had poisoned the reservoir in an attempt to kill Chairman 
Mao Zedong and other top Communist Party leaders who were living downstream at 
Zhongnanhai.  
2: Beijing’s Water Resources
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1972   
To determine the real cause of the pollution, the central government assembled a team 
of 300 experts. Their mandate was to assess the state of the reservoir scientifically, 
including the quality of water flowing into the reservoir and the relationship between 
pollutants and human health. The team, known as the Guanting Reservoir Conservation 
Group, quickly discovered that at least 242 industries and factories were polluting 
the rivers which flow into the reservoir. They identified the worst polluters as 39 state 
enterprises engaged in mining and the production of pesticides, pharmaceuticals, 
leather, paper, and rubber. 
1973-1983 
In response to the Guanting conservation group’s findings, the central government set 
up a special fund of US$4 million (30 million yuan) to address pollution in the reservoir 
area. Using this fund, the group worked with the polluting enterprises to reduce the 
volume of wastewater and pollutants entering the reservoir. As a result, there was no 
further decline in water quality in the reservoir during this period.  
The effort to clean up and protect Guanting reservoir marked the beginning of state-led 
environmental protection in post-1949 China. A number of valuable approaches to water 
resources management were introduced, such as pollution prevention and treatment. 
1984  
  
The central government dismantled the Guanting Reservoir Conservation Group despite 
its successful efforts to curb pollution in the reservoir. Like most river valleys in China at 
that time, a surge of small enterprises cropped up along the Yongding tributaries that 
flow into the reservoir. Also, more and more multipurpose dams were built upstream, 
holding back the flow of clean water to the reservoir while polluters secretly discharged 
their untreated wastewater. Water quality quickly deteriorated as inflow declined. 
1997   
A serious pollution incident prompted Beijing to discontinue the use of Guanting as 
a source of drinking water for the nation’s capital. Its water quality deteriorated from 
Category II to Category V, which is regarded as unsafe for use, including irrigation (refer 
to Appendix 1: China’s water quality standards). 
2005  
  
The Beijing Environmental Protection Bureau reports that its water quality has improved 
slightly from Category V to Category IV (Appendix 1). 
. 
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Miyun reservoir 
Officially nicknamed the "Bright Pearl of the Yanshan Mountain." 
Situated 100 kilometres from downtown Beijing on the Yanshan Mountain, the Miyun 
reservoir is Beijing’s single largest source of domestic tap water. 
Completed in the 1960s, Miyun originally had a surface area of 188 square kilometres 
and a maximum water storage capacity of 4.375 billion cubic metres. The dam and 
reservoir were designed as a multi-purpose project, for controlling floods, generating 
power, irrigating farmland, and providing water to Beijing city.  
Miyun’s watershed is mostly rural and is considered the only remaining basin 
with clean water in Beijing. The reservoir supplies the city’s tap water and water 
for refilling Beijing’s dried-up lakes that were once fed by springs – including the 
Summer Palace, Yuyuanta, Beihai Park, and Shenshahai. 
In 1981, faced with a serious drought in the nation’s capital, the State Council 
decided that all water released from Miyun would be reserved for Beijing, and no 
longer allocated to Tianjin municipality (downstream of Beijing). At the same time, the 
municipal government announced its new water allocation policy: water from Miyun 
was reserved for domestic water supply and would not be used to supply industry or 
agriculture. 
The goal of protecting Miyun reservoir as a source of tap water for urban Beijing has 
repeatedly clashed with county-level plans for economic development and revenue 
generation. A chronology follows: 
Tourism development 
In the early 1980s, the Miyun county government announced a plan for developing 
the reservoir area for tourism, which turned out to be a disaster for the reservoir’s 
water quality. The reservoir management agency and other government units built 
hotels and cottages around the reservoir to accommodate tens of thousands of 
weekend visitors. The water quickly became fouled by household sewage, garbage, 
chemicals, and E-coli bacteria. 
Eventually, the municipal government intervened, ordering the demolition of the 
hotels and cottages. It then created a special agency in charge of water conservation 
which issued regulations to curb commercial activities around the reservoir. Certain 
areas around the reservoir were declared off-limits by the new agency. Motorboats 
on the reservoir were banned and roads into the area were ordered closed during the 
flood season.    
2: Beijing’s Water Resources
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Fisheries development
After the tourism industry was shut down, Miyun county government began 
encouraging villagers living around the reservoir to raise fish in cages, in the belief that it 
was an environmentally friendly means of generating local income. Within a few years, 
however, the caged fishery covered an expanse of 4.5 hectares along the reservoir 
shoreline and a study by Beijing’s Environment Protection Bureau found that the 
fishery was a major threat to the reservoir’s water quality. The Bureau reported that the 
amount of bait and fish waste polluting the reservoir was comparable to the amount of 
wastewater discharged by a large city. Again the municipality intervened to protect the 
reservoir and ordered the caged fishery be shut down.
Iron ore mining 
The Miyun county government also promoted iron ore mining, ignoring the new 
conservation agency’s regulations prohibiting commercial activities. To extract iron 
ore, the hills surrounding the reservoir were dynamited, forests were cleared, and soils 
eroded, filling the reservoir with sediment. Iron ore tailings were discharged directly into 
the reservoir which caused the worst pollution in the reservoir’s history. Eventually, the 
municipal government issued a regulation banning mining activities in the area but by 
that time Miyun was already heavily polluted with mining tailings.  
In the last decade, Beijing has taken drastic action to cut down on pollution in the Miyun 
reservoir. It has shut down factories and moved thousands of people away from the 
reservoir in an effort to reduce the amount of household sewage and other pollution 
entering the reservoir.  
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Per capita consumption
Beijing Water Bureau estimates the municipality’s available water supply (based on a multiyear 
average) is about 4 billion cubic metres annually. Since 1949, the amount of water resources 
available per person has dropped from 1000 cubic metres to less than 230 cubic metres as of 
2008. As such, Beijing has become one of the world’s most water-scarce megacities with per 
capita water use now less than one-thirtieth of the world average.
Chapter 3:
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Water consumption within Beijing municipality can be categorized by sector as follows:  
Agriculture •	
Industry •	
Domestic •	
Urban Environment •	
Golf Courses•	
2008 Olympic Games•	
Water consumption by sector
Table 3-1 indicates how much water is consumed by each sector.  The amounts for domestic, 
agriculture, industry, and urban environment sectors were obtained from the 2005 Beijing 
water resources bulletin. Figures for water use by golf courses and the 2008 Olympics are best 
estimates compiled by Beijing researchers. 
Table 3-1: Water consumption by sector (2005)
Sector Volume (million cubic metres)
Percent of Total Water Supply 
(%)
Domestic 1,338 39
Agriculture 1,322 38
Industry 680 20
Urban Environment 110 3
TOTAL 3,450 100
2008 Olympics 200 (estimated) n/a
Golf Courses 27 (estimated) n/a
Table 3-2 provides a range of water demand estimates in a normal year of precipitation. Assuming 
no water is allocated for the urban environment – that is water used for filling Beijing’s lakes and 
irrigating urban landscapes – Beijing’s estimated demand for water is between 4.0 and 4.5 billion 
cubic metres annually. As noted in Chapter 2, Beijing’s actual water supply has dropped below 
4.0 billion cubic metres in the last few years. 
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Table 3-2: Estimated water demand by sector in a normal year of precipitation (based on data 
from 1995, in billion cubic metres) 
Sector Water Demand Percentage
Agriculture 2.2 – 2.6 56%
Industry 1.2 – 1.4 30%
Domestic 0.5 – 0.7 14%
Urban Environment n/a n/a
Total 4.0 – 4.5 100%
From the data presented in Figure 3-1 (and Appendix 2), a number of significant trends in water 
use by sector emerge:      
 
Since 1975, the amount of water used for agriculture has dropped by more than one-half •	
while domestic consumption has increased ten-fold.
From 1995 to 2005, the volume of water used for domestic purposes has more than •	
doubled, accounting for 39 percent of total water use in 2005, up from 17 percent in 1995. 
The volume of water used for agriculture has dropped by one-third, accounting for just 38 •	
percent of total water use in 2005 compared to 56 percent in 1995. 
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Figure 3-1 indicates how water use has changed from 1975 to 2005. 
Figure 3 - 1: Beijing water use by sector
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The volume of water used by industry has dropped by one quarter, accounting for 20 •	
percent of total water use in 2005 compared to 26 percent in 1995. 
A more detailed history of Beijing’s water use by sector follows.    
Agriculture
For centuries, high quality rice was grown exclusively for imperial families on the Beijing plain. 
Today, rice cultivation has been replaced by irrigated crops such as wheat, sorghum, corn, and 
vegetables. 
The expansion of irrigated farmland in Beijing municipality corresponds to the availability of water 
from the Guanting and Miyun reservoirs in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Table 3-3 provides a 
breakdown of water use for irrigated agriculture and area of irrigated farmland from 1949 to 2005. 
Table 3-3: Water use by agriculture 
Period Irrigated farmland (hectares)
Total water consumption 
(million cubic metres)
Pre-1949 14,200 n/a
1958 95,300 573
1960 n/a 1,373
1965 229,800 1,973 
1970 96,800 2,780
1980 340,300 3,050
1985 n/a 2,223
1990 n/a 2,028
1995 n/a 2,010
2005 n/a 1,322
Since the 1970s, drought triggered a number of significant changes in water allocation and use. 
In the early 1970s, the spectre of water shortages in the capital prompted Beijing to increase 
its delivery of water to the city and cut back on water supply for irrigation in rural areas. This 
reallocation forced more than 130,000 hectares of irrigated farmland out of production, or 
about half the total area under irrigation. To provide farmers with an alternative source of water 
for irrigation, an estimated 30,000 wells were dug and the area of irrigated farmland quickly 
expanded to former levels. 
Then, in the 1980s, a four-year drought and water shortages in the city due to surging increases 
in water consumption prompted another round of water reallocation in order to ensure an 
3: Beijing’s Water Consumption
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uninterrupted water supply for urban residents. The municipal government announced that only 
water from medium and small reservoirs and rivers could be used for field irrigation (i.e., for 
wheat, sorghum). Water in Miyun and Guanting was reserved for industry, urban households, and 
irrigated vegetables in suburban areas. The amount of irrigation water released from Miyun and 
Guanting was cut back by about 90 percent. This led to an increased reliance on groundwater for 
irrigation. 
Figure 3-2 indicates the amount of water used for field irrigation from four sources: Guanting 
reservoir, Miyun reservoir, other surface resources (i.e., smaller reservoirs and rivers) and 
groundwater.  
Based on the data presented in Figure 3-2 and Table 3-3, the following water use trends can be 
observed: 
The amount of water used for irrigated agriculture in 2005 is roughly the same volume as •	
in 1960. 
The amount of water used for irrigation peaked in 1980 and has been declining ever since. •	
Use of groundwater for irrigation increased ten-fold between 1958 and 1995, from 257 •	
million cubic metres in 1958 to an average 1,568 million cubic metres between 1985 and 
1995. 
Use of groundwater for irrigation averaged 257 million cubic metres in 1958 to about •	
1,600 million cubic metres between 1985 and 1995.
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Figure 3-3 shows yearly water consumption in rural areas since 1958 from the Miyun and 
Guanting reservoirs.
Use of water from Guanting and Miyun reservoirs for irrigation peaked in 1962 at 1,124 •	
million cubic metres, dropping to an average 622 million cubic metres between 1963 and 
1984 and dropping further to a yearly average of 160 million cubic metres between 1985 
and 1995. 
Industry
Before 1949, there were few industrial enterprises demanding water supply in Beijing, with 
the exception of the Shijingshan (coal-fired) power plant and the Mentougou coal mine. Half a 
century later, Beijing had become the largest industrial city in northern China. Under the slogan 
“transforming a leisure-style town to a production-type city,” China’s leaders vigorously promoted 
the development of heavy industry in the nation’s capital. As of 1995, there were 34,293 industrial 
enterprises citywide consuming 934 million cubic metres of water annually.  
From 1949 onward, industrial water use increased as industry expanded – including metallurgy, 
power generation, chemical production, machinery, textiles, and papermaking. By 1963, industry 
in Beijing was consuming 640 million cubic metres annually compared to just 30 million cubic 
metres in 1949. By 1975, water consumption peaked at 1,407 million cubic metres, which is 
more than twice the amount of water used by Beijing industry today. 
Figure 3 - 2: Average yearly water consumption in rural areas 1958 - 1995
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When the drought hit in the 1980s, Beijing launched a major water conservation campaign. This 
included expansion limits on the so-called shui laohu (or water tigers) – a reference to Beijing’s 
water-intensive industries such as metallurgy, chemical production, and papermaking.
According to official data, industrial water use dropped by about 30 percent as a result of the 
campaign, from 1,350 million cubic metres in 1980 to 934 million cubic metres in 1995. 
Urban environment
Since 1980, Beijing has supplied water to the capital’s depleted lakes and canals, timed with 
public holidays and other national celebrations. City parks such as Zizhuyuan, Beijing Zoo, 
Shenshahai, and Beihai also receive water delivered from Beijing’s reservoirs. 
The watering of Beijing’s urban landscapes is commonly done using rubber dams that block a 
river channel to store water for irrigation. These dams can be seen, for example, along the east 
section of the Liangma River and the Ba River. The water stored behind the rubber dams quickly 
becomes black and fetid. Such projects are implemented in the name of river management, 
flood control, and even wetlands protection, yet no attention is paid to the effect they have on 
groundwater levels and water supply downstream. The notion that rivers have a life of their own 
with specific ecological functions is not considered. 
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Figure 3-4 shows annual water consumption by industry for selected years between 1949 and 
2005.
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Table 3-4 provides a breakdown of water use for Beijing’s urban environment between 1980 and 
1995. Note the amount of water used for this purpose nearly tripled in the drought years of the 
1980s and peaked in 1987. 
By the early 1990s, Beijing’s most famous lakes were visibly deteriorating: Kunming Lake, 
Yuanmingyuan (Old Summer Palace), Beihai (North Sea), Zhongnanhai, Shenshahai, Taoranting, 
Lianhuachi were drying out. In recent years, Beijing has diverted water to these lakes from 
Guanting and Miyun reservoirs. 
Table 3-4: Water for urban environment (million cubic metres)
Year Water consumption Year Water consumption
1980 17.68 1988 51.30
1981 24.39 1989 41.52
1982 36.18 1990 40.47
1983 28.38 1991 39.46
1984 30.20 1992 41.45
1985 38.51 1993 42.32
1986 44.86 1994 38.15
1987 51.77 1995 34.93
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Kunming Lake
In the last three or four years, the Summer Palace, a symbol of Beijing’s imperial 
heritage, has suffered a major water shortage. Kunming Lake, in the heart of the 
Summer Palace complex, is part of a natural river-lake system in Beijing that once acted 
as a reservoir for the city’s northwest. Today the lake is drying up because of drought 
and the city’s disappearing groundwater table. As the lake dries up, what little water 
remains evaporates quickly in the summer heat and it becomes more and more difficult  
to replenish such a large body of water.   
In years gone by, water was released from Miyun reservoir to refill Kunming and other 
man-made lakes in Beijing. But in recent years of drought, the city’s first priority for 
Miyun water is providing Beijing residents with a supply of tap water. Instead, water 
from the heavily polluted Guanting reservoir is delivered to Kunming Lake through 
existing river channels. (Note that almost half the diverted water is lost in delivery – a 
distance of more than 130 kilometres between the reservoir and the lake.) 
Water delivery from Guanting to Kunming Lake occurs four times a year: in March, on 
May 1st (Labour Day), October 1st (National Day) and just before winter before the lake 
freezes. A total of about 10 million cubic metres of water from Guanting is reserved for 
Kunming Lake on an annual basis, in order to maintain a depth of 1.5 to 2 metres. In 
addition, if any special events take place — particularly visits by government leaders 
from foreign countries — the municipal water bureau will send extra water to the lake.
Old Summer Palace 
The Beijing Water Bureau allocates one million cubic metres annually to the lake within 
the Old Summer Palace grounds (also known as Yuanmingyuan Park) even though the 
Palace authorities say they need seven or eight times that amount. 
In 2004, the Palace authority lined the lake bottom with a plastic membrane in hope that 
this would prevent water from seeping into the ground and reduce the required number 
of refillings every year to one instead of three. The US$3.6 million initiative sparked an 
outcry from academics and environmental groups concerned that the plastic lining 
would create a stagnant pool and damage the local ecosystem. 
Shortly after the controversy erupted, Beijing commissioned a number of international 
experts in ecological landscape design to propose alternative conservation measures. 
They proposed a wastewater treatment system that would recycle wastewater and 
capture rain for irrigating the gardens – an approach that has apparently proven 
successful in the southwestern United States and Mexico. 
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Domestic water use  
 
Since the Yuan Dynasty (1271), Beijing residents have relied on springs and shallow wells to draw 
groundwater for household use. Shallow groundwater was plentiful and easily accessible within a 
few metres of ground level, particularly on the alluvial plains between the Yongding and Chaobai 
river valleys. Water was also diverted to the city from springs in Beijing’s western hills, such as the 
well-known Yuquanshan, Wanquanzhuang, and Lianhuachi springs.
Beijing built its first municipal water treatment works in 1908, which had a daily supply capacity 
of 25,000 cubic metres. By 1949, the plant’s daily supply capacity had increased to 58,000 cubic 
metres, which was enough to supply one-third of the city’s population of 4.14 million. 
 
As Beijing’s urban population grew and lifestyles changed, the municipality expanded its water 
supply system to reach more households. Figure 3-5 shows domestic water use in urban districts 
between 1950 and 1995. 
The data presented in Figure 3-5 and Appendix 5 show the following:
Daily per capita domestic water use in urban districts increased seventeen-fold from 0.018 •	
cubic metres in 1950 to 0.302 cubic metres in 1995.
The volume of tap water used in urban districts increased from 7.0 million cubic metres in •	
1950 to 466 million cubic metres in 1995.
As of 1995, tap water use had increased to 76 percent of total domestic water supply in •	
urban districts, compared to 49 percent of total water use in 1970. 
In the last decade, 10 new waterworks have been built to provide Beijing municipality with a daily 
water supply capacity of up to 2.68 million cubic metres. By 2010, another five waterworks are to 
be constructed and three extended which, if completed, will increase the municipality’s capacity 
of water supply to 3.65 million cubic metres daily. 
Eventually the Xiaojiahe treatment plant was built, but its capacity of 20,000 cubic 
metres per day is too small. The plant cannot produce enough treated water to meet 
the required standard for irrigating the gardens. Meanwhile, the Qinghe treatment 
plant which was recently built nearby, and has a much larger treatment capacity than 
Xiaojiahe, has had difficulty negotiating a contract with the Palace authorities. For now, 
the Qinghe plant is dedicated to treating only the water of the Qinghe River, which flows 
through the Olympic Village. 
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Golf courses
Golf courses in Beijing municipality consume an estimated 27 million cubic metres of water 
annually (assuming one 18-hole golf course uses about 1,000 cubic metres per day). 
Beijing was introduced to this new “water tiger” by high ranking officials and the city’s business 
elite during the 1980s. Almost overnight, golf became a symbol of social status and wealth and it 
has had a significant impact on water consumption. There are about 38 standard courses within 
the municipality, including 19 in Chaoyang district and nine in Haidian district, as well as dozens 
of golf practice ranges.
 
Golf courses not only consume a great deal of water (usually groundwater) but cause other 
environmental problems as well. Thousands of hectares of forest or farmland have been 
appropriated by developers and cleared to make way for golf courses. After the land has been 
cleared, agricultural chemicals and disinfectants are applied to the imported sod which pollutes 
the groundwater in the surrounding areas.  
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2008 Olympics
To host the “Green Olympics,” Beijing municipality has developed man-made lakes and streams, 
musical fountains, and new parks, assuming that water will be taken from neighbouring Hebei 
province. Total water consumption during the 2008 Olympics is estimated at 200 million cubic 
metres. Some of the water-intensive sports facilities and waterscapes built for the Olympic Games 
are described below:   
Wenyu – Chaobai Olympics diversion scheme   
In January 2007, the Beijing Water Bureau announced a plan to divert water from the Wenyu 
River to the Chaobai River. The Chaobai River used to flow near the Shunyi Olympic Aquatic Park 
but has had little or no water for a decade now. 
With a budget of 430 million yuan (US$57.3 million), the municipality built a 13-kilometre 
underground pipeline to take 380,000 cubic metres of water from Wenyu to the Jian River, 
which joins the lower reach of the Chaobai River just north of the Olympic Aquatic Park in Shunyi 
district.
Water from Wenyu will not be used by the Olympic Park directly but will be used to improve the 
scenery around the park during the Olympics. The park is near Shunyi town, one of Beijing’s more 
affluent suburbs.
Prior to diversion, water from Wenyu will require treatment because much of the river is ranked 
Category V, which means it is too polluted for any human use, including irrigation (see Appendix 
1). 
Wenyu is the only river still flowing through Beijing with an estimated flow of 400 million cubic 
metres even in a dry year, consisting mostly of wastewater.  Flowing through the heart of one of 
Beijing’s more affluent communities, local residents often complain that its black, stinking water is 
offensive and disgusting. 
Zhongguancun Fountain 
This is a super-sized water landscape featuring a huge fountain, lights and music in the crowded 
Zhongguancun area (known as “Beijing’s Silicon Valley”) in the centre of Haidian district. 
Promoted as a “modern symphony in the city,” the fountain is expected to operate during the 
opening ceremony and then only during national holidays due to its high operating costs. 
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Shunyi Olympic Aquatic Park 
Chosen as the rowing base for the 2008 Olympic Games, the Chaobai River, already dry for years, 
will be filled with water from the Wenyu River this year to form a lake with a surface area of about 
4,000 hectares (or 40 square kilometres). In the 2007 warm-up competition, Chaobai’s dried-up 
riverbed was blocked with two rubber dams at either end and filled with groundwater. 
Harmony Square (also known as Aquatic Paradise) 
Within Shunyi Olympic Aquatic Park, this “fountain in the desert” is designed with a water surface 
of 11.37 million square metres and a fountain that can shoot up as high as 136.8 metres. The 
fountain height represents the year Shunyi town was established: 1368.
Olympic Village Lake 
This newly-constructed lake in the heart of the Olympic Village will be filled with water that has 
been diverted from the Qing River and treated at one of the city’s waterworks. 
Luxury buildings and hotels 
To accommodate millions of Olympic spectators, dozens of luxury buildings and hotels that 
consume a great deal of water have been built. Behind the Haidian Mountain, for example, is the 
newly-built Daoxianghujing (Fragrant Rice Scenic Lake) Hotel which boasts a new man-made 
lake fed by pumped groundwater. In addition, a new national theatre (surrounded by 35,000 
square metres of water), a CCTV building, and an international airport terminal have recently been 
completed.  
Olympics sports facilities 
Thirty-two competition venues and 19 newly-constructed sports facilities, including the main 
sports centre nicknamed the Bird’s Nest, the diving hall nicknamed the Water Cube, and Fengtai 
baseball stadium. The baseball facilities alone will require at least 100,000 cubic metres of water 
annually.  
Urban parks 
 
A new 12,500-hectare green belt of irrigated trees and shrubs dotted with man-made lakes has 
been added to the city’s urban landscapes. 
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From abundance to scarcity in 60 years  
Beijing is running out of freshwater. Although more than 200 rivers and streams can still be 
found on official maps of Beijing, the sad reality is little or no water flows there anymore. Beijing’s 
springs, famous for their sweet-tasting water have disappeared. Finding a clean water source 
anywhere in the city has become impossible.  
As recently as 30 years ago, Beijing residents regarded groundwater as an inexhaustible resource. 
Now hydrogeologists warn it too is running out. Beijing’s groundwater table is dropping, water 
is being pumped out faster than it can be replenished, and more and more groundwater is 
becoming polluted. 
How did Beijing go from water abundance to its present-day crisis? Certainly, drought is an 
important factor. The municipality has endured 25 years of below-average rainfall since the 1980s 
and nine consecutive dry years since 1999. Less rainfall means less surface runoff flowing to 
Beijing’s rivers and reservoirs, and less water available for groundwater recharge. So too, Beijing’s 
growing population and industrial development have driven huge increases in water demand, as 
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the data suggests. But to say that drought and population increase are the main causes behind 
Beijing’s water crisis is an overstatement.
Beijing’s water crisis stems more from decades of short-sighted policies that have degraded 
its watershed and a political fixation on large-scale and environmentally damaging engineering 
projects to keep the taps flowing at little or no charge to consumers. On the demand side, water 
consumption has been divorced from consequence without price signals to indicate scarcity.   
Beginning after “New China” was established in 1949, state-owned logging companies cut down 
the forests at the headwaters of Beijing’s rivers. People were encouraged to farm every denuded 
hillside and mountain top, and to create more farmland by draining wetlands. Also, the rivers 
were dammed: at least 85 reservoirs have been built in Beijing’s outlying districts since the 1950s 
to store water for industrial development and irrigated agriculture. Soon the rivers began drying 
out as more and more of this water was diverted from the reservoirs to nearby fields and industry, 
with the balance supplying the city with drinking water via man-made canals.       
Beijing’s policy of guaranteeing water supply to the capital – even as its rivers and reservoirs 
were drying up – has wreaked havoc on farmers and encouraged wasteful consumption by 
industry and urban consumers. The experience with Beijing’s two largest reservoirs, Guanting 
and Miyun, is a case in point. When drought struck in the early 1970s, the central government 
cut back the amount of water released from the two reservoirs to Beijing’s farmers. This forced 
more than 100,000 hectares of irrigated farmland out of production and prompted the digging of 
30,000 wells so that farmers had an alternative supply of irrigation water. So began rural Beijing’s 
exhausting reliance on groundwater for irrigation.    
When another drought hit in the early 1980s, once again the authorities cut back water for 
irrigation in order to guarantee supply to urban residents. By this time, Miyun and Guanting were 
supplying tap water to millions of urban households. Also, more and more groundwater was 
being pumped to meet urban demand. So even amidst drought, urban residents and industry 
were supplied with water without the benefit of price feedback to signal water scarcity and 
promote conservation.               
Today more than two-thirds of the entire municipality’s water supply comes from groundwater, 
having exhausted the city’s two largest reservoirs. Guanting and Miyun now hold less than ten 
percent of their original storage capacity, and Guanting can no longer supply the capital with 
drinking water because it is too polluted.    
Through the 1980s and 1990s, Beijing pumped groundwater at an annual rate of 2.8 or 2.9 billion 
cubic metres, far exceeding the so-called safe or allowable limit of extraction (where the rate of 
extraction is lower than the rate of recharge – experts have set this limit at 2.0 to 2.5 billion cubic 
metres annually.) To date, an estimated 6 billion cubic metres of groundwater has been extracted 
above the safe limit and may never be replenished. 
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In the last few decades, Beijing has lost much of its capacity to recharge groundwater. In addition 
to rising demand (which increases extraction,) the expanse of roads, buildings, and infrastructure 
now covering the natural ground surface mean that less water is seeping back into the ground. 
Also, because all the rivers have been dammed, the floodplains downstream no longer receive the 
floodwaters that used to recharge groundwater naturally. 
Official responses to Beijing’s drought and competing water demands
The central government’s first response to drought and competing demands for water was 
to reallocate water from Beijing’s two largest reservoirs to industry and urban residents, thus 
depriving farmers of water for irrigation. Then, as Miyun and Guanting lost their capacity to 
provide water to the city, groundwater use rapidly increased. In the last five years, with Beijing’s 
surface and groundwater supplies nearing exhaustion, the State Council has ordered a series of 
“emergency water transfers” from outside Beijing municipality via newly-constructed canals and 
reservoirs. The State Council has also imposed restrictions on water use in upstream Hebei in an 
effort to increase river flow to Beijing. In this way, Beijing’s incessant demand for new supply, and 
its political authority to take water from other river basins, now threatens millions of water users 
beyond its watershed.      
Beijing’s policy responses to the water crisis:
Reallocate surface water from rural to urban consumers•	
Extract ever-deeper groundwater •	
Divert surface water to Beijing city from reservoirs and rivers outside Beijing municipality•	
Restrict water use in upstream Hebei•	
Cut off river flow to downstream Tianjin•	
Shut down or relocate polluting and water-intensive industries •	
Karst groundwater supply expansion    
To slow the depletion of groundwater aquifers on Beijing plain, China’s Ministry of Water 
Resources developed a plan to extract groundwater from karst aquifers in Beijing’s outlying 
districts. Traditionally, these karst aquifers – with groundwater at depths of 1,000 metres or more 
– have been protected as emergency water reserves for use only in times of war or for use by 
future generations. But in 2004, the national water ministry completed two of five planned deep 
groundwater extraction projects (See Table 4-1). 
The total amount of karst groundwater to be extracted annually from the five sites ranges from 
274 to 452 million cubic metres. Notably, an earlier assessment recommended less extraction; no 
more than 200 million cubic metres annually and an additional 200 to 400 million cubic metres for 
emergencies.  But it is not clear what kind of emergency would trigger the maximum extraction of 
karst groundwater.
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Karst groundwater 
Karst refers to a type of terrain, usually formed on carbonate rock (limestone and 
dolomite) through which groundwater flows to form a subsurface drainage system and 
discharges at surface level springs. Groundwater flow in karst aquifers is significantly 
different from that of other aquifers because its flows are turbulent with velocities 
approaching those of surface streams. Groundwater flow in aquifers composed of 
sand, gravel or bedrock is usually very slow. Karst groundwater systems are extremely 
vulnerable to contamination; they can create sinkholes and cause sinkhole collapse.  
In North China, geologists estimate there are about 100 large karst spring systems 
each with a watershed area from 500 to over 4,000 square kilometres with an average 
discharge from 1 to 13 cubic metres per second. 
Despite objections raised by some experts, proponents of karst groundwater extraction argued 
that little harm would be done to the environment apart from a drawdown effect on other wells 
in the area which are currently used for irrigation. In response to concerns about sustainability, 
proponents argued that the karst aquifers would be replenished once the years of ample rainfall 
return. 
Table 4-1 Karst groundwater extraction sites (10,000 metres/day)
Site (river basin) Water supply Emergency extraction Status
Pinggu district (Jucuo) 37 50 Completed 2004
Lianghe Village, 
Huairou county 
(Chaobai)
10 35 Completed 2004
Changgou Fangshan 
county (Dashi)
20 30 n/a
Yuquanshan 
to Kunming 
Lake(Yongding)
10 30 n/a
Nanshao Changping 
district (Wenyu)
10 20 n/a
Surface water supply expansion  
In 2003, the central government began arranging ‘emergency water transfers’ from neighbouring 
regions to Beijing city. (See Table 4-2). 
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South-North diversion project 
The State Council’s ultimate solution to Beijing’s water crisis is the massive South-North diversion 
project, first proposed by Mao Zedong in 1952 and approved by the central government in 2001. 
If all three routes are completed, as much as 48 billion cubic metres of water will be extracted 
from the Yangtze River and delivered to Beijing at a cost of at least US$60 billion, more than twice 
the official cost of the Three Gorges dam. South-North diversion proponents talk of quenching 
Beijing’s thirst with “surplus” water from the Yangtze, as if draining China’s longest river – 
Shanghai’s water supply – would have little or no economic or environmental consequences for 
the millions of people in southern and southwestern China. 
Table 4-2: Beijing’s water transfer schemes
Completion date
Water volume 
(million cubic 
metres)
Diversion from: Diversion to: Distance (km)
Sep 2003 – Oct 
2005
n/a Cetian reservoir 
in Datong city, 
Shanxi province.
Via canals to 
Sanggan and 
Yang rivers, 
which flow into 
the Yongding 
river and the 
Guanting 
reservoir.
185
Sep 2003 – Oct 
2005
142 4 existing 
reservoirs 
in Hebei 
province: Youyi, 
Xiangshuibao, 
Huliuhe, and 
Yunzhou.
See above 80 
2004 10 Baihebao 
reservoir Beijing 
municipality 
Miyun reservoir, 
Beijing 
75
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Completion date
Water volume 
(million cubic 
metres)
Diversion from: Diversion to: Distance (km)
2008 400 Shijiazhuang-
Beijing section of 
the South-North 
water transfer 
project (central 
route). 
Includes 4 newly-
constructed 
reservoirs in 
Hebei Province: 
Gangnan and 
Huangbizhuang 
on the Hutuo 
river; Wangkuai 
on the Daqing 
River, and 
Xidayang 
on Tongtian, 
Wuming and 
Tang rivers. 
Beijing 200-300
2010 1,200 Danjiangkou 
reservoir Han 
River (Yangtze 
tributary) Hubei 
province
Tuancheng Lake, 
Beijing
1,271
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Beijing water policy: 2008 Olympic Games and beyond
With the 2008 Olympic Games imminent, the central government announced its three policies for 
ensuring Beijing has adequate water supplies for the Olympics and beyond. The policies are: 
Extract water from river basins outside Beijing municipality •	
This policy refers to water diversion projects underway to bring water from Hebei in time 
for the Olympics, and from the Yangtze by 2010. See Table 4-2.
  
Increase runoff from upstream areas•	
This policy refers to a “water allocation plan” issued earlier this year by China’s Ministry 
of Water Resources and the country’s lead planning agency, the National Development 
and Planning Commission. Under this plan, upstream Shanxi and Hebei provinces must 
guarantee surface water to Beijing as follows: 420 million cubic metres in a normal year, 
215 million cubic metres in a moderately dry year, and 90 million cubic metres in a dry 
year.
Exploit and protect groundwater •	
As noted earlier, more than two-thirds of Beijing’s current water supply comes from 
groundwater within Beijing municipality, including karst groundwater from depths of 
1,000 metres or more. This latest policy announcement refers to restrictions imposed 
on groundwater use outside Beijing municipality, which the central government claims 
will help increase surface runoff to Beijing. For example, Hebei province has banned 
groundwater use in the area where Beijing’s largest rivers, Yongding and Chaobai, are 
said to originate – the Bashang area of Hebei’s Zhangjiakou city, northeast of Beijing. 
Zhangjiakou city has also introduced a water licensing system aimed at restricting the use 
of groundwater for growing vegetables.   
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Endless supply expansion is not the answer
Taking ever more water from ever further jurisdictions beyond Beijing may be an emergency 
measure to ease Beijing’s water shortages and flush out its polluted waterways, but it is not a 
fundamental solution. Long distance diversion is extraordinarily expensive and environmentally 
damaging. Even if water is successfully diverted from Hebei province in 2008 and the Yangtze 
River in 2010, groundwater will continue to be Beijing’s most important water source. The 
municipality will still need to continue pumping about three billion cubic metres of groundwater 
annually to keep up with the forecasted growth in demand – that’s 500 million cubic metres over 
the annual allowable limit for “safe” extraction. With each new project to tap water somewhere 
else, demand for water increases at an ever greater cost to China’s environment and economy.       
Whether diverting surface water or digging ever-deeper for groundwater, the underlying 
solution proposed is like trying to “quench thirst by drinking poison.” Nor is there more sense 
in the proposals to move the capital south or resettle downtown residents to new towns in the 
municipality. This would only transfer the twin problems of shortages and profligate consumption 
to other areas. There is a better way.
Chapter 5:
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Reduce demand using the rule of law and economic incentives
The key to addressing Beijing’s water crisis is not more engineering projects to deliver new 
supplies. More dams, diversion canals, pipelines and even desalination plants may be technically 
feasible but they are economically and environmentally ruinous. A better approach would be to 
curb demand through efficiency improvements in water supply and consumption using the rule of 
law and economic incentives. A growing number of experts in China recognize the principles and 
potential of this approach, which is introduced below.
Enforce existing laws and regulations
Experts and environmentalists have long urged Beijing authorities to enforce existing laws and 
regulations aimed at curbing unaccountable and water-profligate urban development within the 
municipality. The State Council, for example, has issued regulations requiring that any plan or 
undertaking to take water or store water in rivers must be subject to approval by the relevant 
authorities. Enforcing such regulations along with full disclosure would force proponents to 
account for their proposed actions and would thereby discourage environmentally damaging 
schemes.
Other laws and regulations, if enforced, would oblige the central and municipal authorities to take 
the following action within Beijing municipality: 
Shut down polluting factories;•	
Prohibit development projects in water source protection zones; •	
Prohibit the dumping of untreated industrial wastewater and household sewage into •	
Beijing’s waterways; 
Suspend the construction of golf courses;  •	
Impose fines on water polluters•	
Impose full-cost water pricing to reduce demand and promote efficiency  
China’s State Environmental Protection Agency, the country’s top environmental regulator, as well 
as the Beijing Water Bureau and other government authorities have endorsed full-cost pricing as 
an effective tool for managing demand and promoting efficient water use. In the last 15 years, the 
municipality has increased water rates nine times. The current residential rate for water is 3.7 yuan 
per cubic metre, which is the highest in China, and more than 30 times the 1991 price of 0.12 
yuan. But like many jurisdictions world-wide, Beijing’s water rates do not yet reflect the full cost of 
water treatment, sewage, delivery, tapping the water source, and the value of the water itself. 
In 2006, the National Development and Reform Commission issued a regulation on water pricing, 
capping certain expenditures and stipulating what should be covered in the rates charged to 
consumers. Under this regulation, water prices should include the cost of tapping the water 
resources, providing the running water, constructing the infrastructure required for delivery, and 
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treating sewage. Capital costs, meanwhile, continue to be subsidized by the central government 
which means that current rates don’t come close to the full cost of supply expansion.
Full-cost pricing is essential for curbing demand: those who pay for and benefit from water and 
water services are more inclined to conserve water than when the resource (or the service) is 
given away for free or below-cost. Higher water prices that better reflect the true cost of using 
water would send important information to consumers and water providers about the value and 
availability of water. This would enable consumers to make informed decisions about use and limit 
demand for new supplies. 
Introducing higher prices would also encourage investment in sewage and wastewater treatment, 
encourage factories and other large consumers to recycle water, discourage over-expansion of 
water-intensive industries, encourage farmers to switch to less water-intensive agriculture or 
livelihoods, and encourage investments to reduce system losses (i.e., plugging or replacing leaky 
mains and water pipes).    
Table 5-1 provides a breakdown of water and sewerage rates for residential consumers in 
Beijing in 2003 and 2004. According to the World Bank, full-cost recovery in the water sector 
would require rates to go up at least another 35 percent, to 5.0 yuan per cubic metre or higher. 
At current prices, Beijing’s state-owned water companies are profitably operating a number of 
wastewater and sewage treatment plants, although it’s not known what, if any, portion of their 
capital costs are passed on to consumers in the prices they pay. If operated as planned, the new 
plants may allow Beijing municipality to meet its goal of treating 90 percent of its wastewater by 
2008. 
Table 5-1: Residential water and sewerage rates  
Fee 2003 (yuan/cubic metre) 2004 (yuan/cubic metre)
Water resource (Includes 
surface and groundwater)
0.6 1.10
Tap water supply   (operation 
and maintenance costs, as 
well as some portion of the 
capital costs)
1.7 1.08
Sewage treatment 0.6 0.9
Tax 0.33 n/a
Wastewater disposal n/a 0.90
TOTAL 2.9 3.7
*1 yuan = 0.145 USD (June, 2008)  
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With higher prices for water and water services, the enormous potential for saving water (and 
thereby reducing demand) is no longer a theoretical proposition. Efficiency improvements will 
increasingly become an attractive investment opportunity for any number of companies supplying 
specialized technologies and processes that help consumers reduce their water and sewerage 
bills. Consider the potential for recycling water as one example: Beijing industries currently recycle 
only about 15 percent of their water, compared to 85 percent in industrial countries.  
Beijing’s rising state water companies     
Beijing Capital invests in wastewater treatment plants and drinking water facilities 
in Beijing and in 12 other cities. Its subsidiary, Beijing Water Company is treating 2.1 
million cubic metres of wastewater annually.  
Beijing Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research Corporation 
was founded in 1993 as a company specializing in water treatment under the China 
Institute of Water Resources and Hydropower Research. Beijing IWHR Corporation 
recently formed a partnership with Mitsubishi (Japan) and Anglian Water (UK) to 
build a $200 million water processing facility in Chaoyang district. The facility will take 
untreated water from Miyun reservoir and supply 500,000 cubic metres of potable water 
per day. 
Beijing Waterworks Group is the largest tap water supplier in China and the only 
tap water supplier in the Beijing area. The company is responsible for supplying urban 
households in the city centre and in seven suburbs. It operates 20 tap water factories 
supplying 3.15 million cubic metres per day. 
Establish a water industry regulator
Higher water rates on their own don’t guarantee benefits to consumers or to the environment. 
When the job of setting rates is left to proponents of water projects or to politicians, consumers 
may see rates go up without any measurable improvement in water service or the environment. 
Conversely, rates could remain below-cost as the government continued to subsidize 
environmentally damaging supply expansion in the name of cheap water. 
In setting rates there are two parties to the contract: water suppliers and water consumers. The 
latter have the right to demand and receive certain services and the former have the right to 
recoup costs fairly. To ensure rates are reasonable for both suppliers and consumers, the complex 
technical task of setting water rates – deciding what goes into prices and who can charge how 
much for what services – should be given to an economic regulator separate from the water and 
sewerage service providers and from the politicians. This would enforce the rights and obligations 
of both suppliers and consumers. 
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Currently, China’s National Development and Reform Commission, the country’s top planning 
agency, issues regulations governing the water industry, but enforcing those regulations is 
generally left to municipal and district governments and the service providers themselves – 
including government departments and state-owned water companies. Inevitably, conflicts of 
interest arise, which create perverse incentives to pollute water, waste water, hide problems 
and inflate costs. Beijing Capital, for example, is an investor, planner, builder, operator, policy-
maker and de facto regulator of its own wastewater treatment business in Beijing. Beijing 
Capital’s investors and customers would benefit from a separate economic regulator that sets 
price limits, reviews its costs, and ensures that Beijing Capital and other service providers are 
providing consumers with the best quality water services at fair prices to both parties. (In parallel, 
the country’s environmental regulator, State Environmental Protection Agency, must ensure 
that water and sewerage companies comply with the country’s laws pertaining to water source 
development and protection.)  
Ideally, the economic regulator should ensure that water prices cover the full cost of the 
infrastructure required to treat, store and distribute the water. Prices should vary depending on 
the users’ distance from the source of supply, since long distance delivery will have higher costs 
(and more water losses) than local sources. The price should include a charge for the water itself 
– one that reflects the value of the resource and its scarcity. That portion of the price should vary 
depending on the availability of water in the watershed; it should vary with season and even in 
some cases with time of day. Ideally, the price should also reflect how much of the water is lost 
through evaporation and how much water is eventually returned to the source.  
Above all, the regulator must set price limits, review costs and make decisions on awarding 
or denying rate increases to service providers in a transparent manner to prevent any price 
manipulation or other forms of monopoly abuse. Consumers are less likely to object to paying 
higher rates for good service if they can verify and have confidence that their money is going 
to sensible investments in efficiency improvements and state-of-the-art wastewater treatment 
facilities, for example, and not to ill-advised investments, inflated staff salaries or Swiss bank 
accounts.  
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Regulating the UK water industry: Clean water at fair prices   
Ofwat, the Water Services Regulation Authority for England and Wales, regulates water 
and sewerage companies in England and Wales.  www.ofwat.gov.uk
Ofwat sets the maximum price at which water companies can sell their water and other 
services. Every five years, Ofwat reviews the business plans of the water companies 
before setting an annual price limit for the next five years for each company. The price 
limit on rates is meant to allow enough revenue for operations, investment, and a 
reasonable return on investment. The return on investment is needed to raise financing 
for reinvestment in the system.
 
Ofwat requires water and sewerage companies to make efficiency improvements (i.e., 
plug leaky pipes) and rewards them by allowing them to keep a portion of the cost 
savings while passing the rest onto customers in the form of lower rates. The regulator 
also publishes comparisons between companies to help raise the standards of those 
companies that may be out of compliance with standards and need to improve their 
performance.
Rates: Ofwat has approved successive rate increases to allow companies to finance 
improved quality standards and service levels. Note that rate increases would likely 
have been far greater if the companies had not become more efficient in response to 
regulation. 
According to the World Bank, water consumers in England and Wales currently pay 
between US$2.20 and $2.70 per cubic metre of water, which is roughly five times 
the rate of US$0.54 (3.7 yuan) per cubic metre in Beijing. Brazilians pay on average 
between US$0.65 and $0.80 per cubic metre of water.   
Investment: UK water companies have invested US$ 97 billion in upgrading water 
systems since privatization in 1989. Between 2005 and 2010, UK water companies are 
planning to invest another US$10.7 billion to further improve drinking water and protect 
the environment. 
Performance: 99.94 percent of the drinking water supplied by UK water companies 
currently meets international standards. Beaches (historically contaminated by sewage 
and wastewater) meeting compulsory standards for water quality rose from 66 percent 
in 1984 to 98.5 percent in 2004. 
In the last decade, UK water companies have reduced the amount of water lost to 
leaks by an average 30 percent. Ofwat reports that London’s leakage rates remain 
unacceptably high so it has set new targets for efficiency improvements to be made in 
2009 and 2010.   
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Assign tradable water rights to manage competing water demands
Another promising tool for making better use of Beijing’s scarce water resources is tradable water 
rights. Earlier this year, the central government introduced a framework for allocating water rights 
across provinces and municipalities. The Interim Measure for Water Quantity, which came into 
effect on February 1, 2008, lays out the principles, mechanisms and practices for water allocation. 
Although a review of this legislation is beyond the scope of this report, proponents believe it could 
potentially reduce demand and accelerate conservation in jurisdictions with competing water 
demands and extremely limited water supply, based on the experience in parts of Australia and 
the western United States. 
If regulated properly, a tradable water rights regime within Beijing municipality could potentially 
shift current water allocations to users that most value the water. So, for example, instead of 
taking water from farmers, a Beijing water company would have the option to buy water from 
them or other users with prior rights, whether agricultural or industrial. Other parties, such as 
conservation groups, resort owners, park authorities and anyone else with an interest in seeing 
more water left in streams, should also be allowed to purchase water rights for instream flows.
Assigning water rights to existing users or groups of users (i.e., water utilities, farmers, and 
industry) must come first, however. Such rights would give existing water users the option to buy 
or sell their water rights. In times of water shortage, the older water rights holders would have 
priority over newer rights holders. Under such a regime, state or municipal water companies in 
China could no longer take water from other users and jurisdictions, they would have to buy it, 
and under strictly regulated terms. 
To protect the environment, allocated water rights must reflect not only the amount of water 
that may be extracted by the rights holder, but also the amount that may be consumed and the 
amount that must be returned to the source. There would also need to be strict requirements as 
to the quality of water returned by the rights holder to the source. In Beijing’s case, where water 
in rivers and aquifers is already over-allocated, the total amount of water allocated under the new 
rights regime would have to be less an amount needed for incremental restoration of its depleted 
water sources. 
The process of assigning rights and administering the trading of those rights requires systems 
for accurately measuring and monitoring surface and groundwater use as well as a transparent 
regulatory system to prevent abuse. 
Whether tradable water rights can be made to work for the benefit of water consumers and the 
environment remains to be seen. For most countries, not just China, establishing tradable water 
rights is a major challenge after decades of water exploitation without the benefit of economic 
discipline or effective environmental regulation. But it is hard to imagine a country and a city 
region where the need and potential for success is greater.  
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Notes
Beijing is both a city and a municipality or region that includes rural and urban areas. For the 1. 
purpose of this report, Beijing refers to the municipality unless otherwise noted.
The bulk of the historical water supply and consumption data presented in this report was 2. 
obtained from the Beijing Water Bureau. The history of Guanting and Miyun reservoir 
management is provided by sources in Beijing. Information related to water supply and 
consumption during the 2008 Olympics is based on interviews with government officials and 
official news sources. 
Because of the difficulty verifying data, this report represents a best estimate of the current 3. 
situation based on official sources, eyewitness accounts, and expert opinion.
The report acknowledges that government authorities have introduced many water-saving 4. 
programs and campaigns in response to Beijing’s water crisis. However, without access to 
verifiable data it is not possible to assess what, if any, effect such programs have had on 
Beijing’s water consumption and demand. Open access to data and further investigation is 
required. 
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Beijing Water Report 2008
Class Description
Category I Applies to water sources and national nature reserves
Category II Applies to class A water source protection areas for centralized drinking 
water supply, sanctuaries for rare fish species and spawning grounds for 
fish and shrimp 
Category III Applies to class B water source protection areas for centralized drinking 
water supply, sanctuaries for common fish species and swimming zones
Category IV Applies to water bodies for general industrial water supply and recreational 
waters in which there is no direct human contact with the water
Category V Applies to water bodies for agricultural water supply and for general 
landscape requirements
Category V+ Not to be used
China’s Water Quality Standards
Appendix 1:
China’s water quality standards
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Water use by sector (million cubic metres/year) 
Year Agriculture Industry Domestic Urban 
Environment
TOTAL
2005 1,322 680 1,338 110 3,450
38% 20% 39% 3% 100%
1995 2,010 934 616 34.93 3,595
56% 26% 17% 1% 100%
1985 2,223 909 415 38.51 3,586
62% 25% 12% 1% 100%
1975 2,938 1,407 185 n/a 4,530
65% 31% 4% 100%
Appendix 2:
Water use by sector
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Water consumption in Beijing municipality’s rural areas 1958-1995 (million cubic meters)
Year
Surface Water
Ground
Water
Industrial 
Waste-
water
Total
Other
Reservoirs
& Rivers
Sub - TotalGuanting 
reservoir
Miyun
reservoir
Sub-
total
1958 114 114 168 282 257 34 573
1959 126 126 211 337 225 98 660
1960 489 489 405 894 215 264 1373
1961 387 424 811 201 1012 365 229 1606
1962 501 623 1124 200 1324 260 156 1740
1963 209 422 631 247 878 316 168 1362
1964 227 128 355 216 571 442 139 1152
1965 538 378 916 279 1195 580 198 1973
1966 189 472 661 226 887 950 263 2100
1967 254 251 505 273 778 739 181 1698
1968 519 409 928 226 1154 1024 245 2423
1969 383 108 491 284 775 900 209 1884
1970 581 297 878 359 1237 1229 314 2780
1971 122 574 669 341 1037 1266 381 2684
1972 69 383 412 269 681 1215 366 2262
1973 7 247 254 298 552 698 333 1583
1974 88 473 561 424 985 730 535 2250
1975 114 751 865 381 1246 1083 609 2938
1976 9 454 463 358 821 1311 421 2553
1977 65 303 366 444 810 869 502 2181
1978 57 515 572 456 1028 846 499 2373
1979 119 453 644 310 954 983 485 2422
1980 269 630 899 372 1271 1379 1379 3172
Appendix 3:
Water consumption in Beijing municipality’s 
rural areas 1958-1995
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Year
Surface Water
Ground 
Water
Industrial 
Waste-
water
Total
Other
Reservoirs
& Rivers
Sub - TotalGuanting 
reservoir
Miyun
reservoir
Sub-
total
1981 109 333 442 312 754 1691 405 285
1982 77 331 408 354 762 1696 413 2871
1983 163 449 612 326 938 1729 442 3109
1984 66 392 458 221 679 1674 329 2682
1985 25 155 180 232 412 1569 242 2223
1986 32 211 243 274 517 1586 228 2331
1987 31 121 152 286 438 1471 220 2129
1988 30 196 226 284 510 1514 199 2223
1989 61 188 249 249 311 1617 229 2406
1990 40 124 164 417 581 1447 2028
1991 24 90 114 438 552 1558 2110
1992 30 131 161 301 462 1649 2111
1993 24 138 162 323 385 1620 147 2152
1994 9 96 105 321 426 1643 2069
1995 8 47 55 375 430 1580 2010
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Water use by industry 1949-1995 (million cubic meters)
Year
Industrial Output
Power 
industry
Other Industries
Total
Water
Consump-
tion
Growth 
rate (%)
100 
million
yuan 
RMB*
Growth 
rate %
Districts Counties Sub-total
1949 1 24 7 1 8 32
1950 3 200 36 7 1 8 44 40.3
1955 13 33.8 70 23 3 26 96 16.9
1960 85 46 656 222 3.5 257 913 56.9
1965 54 3.7 353 261 41 303 656 -6.4
1970 118 15.9 432 364 81 445 877 6.0
1975 193 10.5 661 525 221 746 1,407 9.9
1980 305 9.5 590 531 230 760 1,350 -0.8
1985 469 9.0 249 435 228 660 909 -7.6
1990 791 11.0 211 396 223 619 830 -1.8
1995 1363 11.5 210 392 332 724 934 2.1
*Based on the fixed price in 1990
Appendix 4:
Water use by industry 1949-1995
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Water use in urban districts (million cubic metres) 
Year
Water consumption
(million cubic metres
Daily per capita 
(cubic metres)
Wells Tap water Sub-total
1950 2 7 9 0.018
1955 14 35 48 0.051
1960 32 97 129 0.087
1965 73 102 175 0.119
1970 82 93 175 0.135
1975 103 154 257 0.185
1980 135 215 350 0.220
1985 140 275 415 0.240
1990 145 315 46 0.234
1995 150 466 616 0.302
Appendix 5:
Water use in urban districts
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Beijing’s water and sewerage system 
Problem Recent Improvements
Water mains lose 20 percent 
of water in delivery; more than 
double the rate of loss in most 
cities around the world.
Beijing Waterworks Group is investing $256 million to 
upgrade the water system, including $22 million to repair 
leaking pipes. 
Halma Water Management installed more than 3,000 
“loggers” to detect leaks in Beijing’s water mains in 2007.
Beijing discharges 1.13 billion 
cubic metres of wastewater; 
one-third from industry, 
two-thirds from domestic 
households (2005 Beijing 
Water Resources Bulletin).
Beijing Sewage Group is building 10 new sewage plants to 
meet the goal of treating 90 percent of Beijing’s wastewater 
and sewage by 2008. 
Zenon, a global wastewater technology company, has 
invested $6 million in 12 industrial wastewater treatment 
projects in Beijing. One project will allow the Beijing Yanshan 
Petrochemical Company to treat and reuse its wastewater as 
process water and to feed its boilers.
Praxair, a global industrial gas company, is supplying oxygen 
to three wastewater re-use plants operated by Beijing 
Drainage Group Company.
Appendix 6:
Beijing’s water and sewerage system
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